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Abstract—Technical design can produce exclusionary and 
even discriminatory effects for users. A lack of discriminatory 
intent is insufficient to avoid discriminatory design, since implicit 
assumptions about users rarely include all relevant user 
demographics, and in some cases, designing for all relevant users 
is actually impossible. To minimize discriminatory effects of 
technical design, an actively anti-discriminatory design 
perspective must be adopted.  
This article provides examples of discriminatory user 
exclusion, then defining exclusionary design in terms of 
disaffordances and dysaffordances. Once these definitions are in 
place, principles of anti-discriminatory design are advanced, 
drawing upon a method of phenomenological variation employed 
in the context of standpoint epistemology. 
Keywords—design; affordances; discrimination; race; gender; 
religion; engineering 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Technological design cannot possibly accommodate every 
user, but there are clear cases where the line is crossed from 
mere loss of functionality to discriminatory user exclusion, as 
recognized legally through e.g. ADA compliance and as 
recognized socially through e.g. popular rejection of so-called 
“flesh colored” crayons. This paper constructs a theory of 
disaffordances and dysaffordances that identifies forms of 
exclusion which are materially or socially exclusive in ways 
which can rise to the level of discrimination, then 
recommending principles which may aid in proactively anti-
discriminatory design processes. 
II. USER EXCLUSION AND THE DISCRIMINATORY THRESHOLD 
The exclusion of some users seems inevitable in many 
design contexts, and in many of these cases user exclusion is 
not discriminatory. A clothing designer, for the most part, 
designs an article of clothing as conforming with male or 
female gendered norms for self-presentation, and it would 
clearly be a misconstrual of an appropriate understanding of 
discriminatory design to fault a woman’s dress or blouse for 
failing to afford men’s gender-typical self-presentation. Here, 
patterns of user behavior require design targeted at a distinct 
user demographic, and require such targeting to take place in a 
way which tends to be exclusionary of other demographics.  
It is less clearly non-discriminatory if a designer chooses to 
produce, for example, clothing not only for women in 
particular, but for very thin women in particular, since here 
norms of user behavior do not delimit the design space: making 
a particular dress design in a large variety of sizes may require 
creativity and artfulness in order to give the right effect for all 
wearers, but it does not present either the same degree or the 
same kind of problem as designing a dress to be gender-typical 
clothing for a variety of gender presentations. Clothing, 
however, can be obtained from a great variety of designers 
without significantly compromising its functionality for the 
user, and there are designers enough to provide reasonable 
access to the ability to clothe oneself to the variety of kinds of 
user embodiment, with the possible exception of those persons 
whose bodies are at the upper limits of humanly possible size. 
It may be that designers cluster in the design space that caters 
to privileged body types, producing more variety and 
availablity to some rather than others, but it seems perhaps an 
overstrong claim to describe this effect as discriminatory. 
By contrast, were a company to require job applications to 
be submitted via an online system which was incompatible 
with screen readers—assuming that being sighted was not a 
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)—this would be 
clearly discriminatory, as it would remove eligibility for 
employment for a non-employment-related reason. The 
difference (1) is not merely in ease of access, but in access 
itself; (2) does not reflect a difference in user demographics 
that requires distinct provision of services to distinct 
demographics; and (3) cannot be accommodated through 
multiple equivalent providers of service, since employers 
provide substantially different opportunities to employees, 
unlike e.g. clothes which perform at least their primary 
functions with little difference between available brand names. 
These examples illustrate a threshold which separates 
exclusion which is (a.i) pragmatically necessary or (a.ii) 
optional but unproblematic from exclusion which is (b.) 
discriminatory. Here, we see the discriminatory impact arise 
even while considering the technical interface with the user in 
isolation from compounding social factors. When we consider 
compounding social factors as well, we can see that 
discriminatory effects can be created even in the absence of all 
three of the factors initially identified above. 
A classic example of discriminatory design is the Band-
Aid. The original and standard color of the Band-Aid seems 
designed to appear inconspicuous when placed on the skin of 
some but not all users. It could be argued that this is akin to 
designing clothes for either male or female gender 
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presentation: the user demographics provide a forced choice, 
since the product function will be broken for either light- or for 
dark-skinned users, depending on whether a dark or light skin 
tone is used for the product’s color. Given the forced choice, it 
seems then unproblematic to choose to accommodate the 
majority rather than a minority of users. However, the fact that 
all brands of commercially available adhesive bandages made 
this same individual determination to cater to the majority 
creates an emergent problem: access to this function is denied 
upon racial lines. 
This itself is not a major concern. The primary function of 
the adhesive bandage is not related to its color, and remains 
accessible for all users, and the disadvantage of diminished 
skin color similarity presents little substantial impact on 
anyone’s life, considered in isolation. Moments in our lives are 
not, however, experienced in isolation, and neither can they be 
properly understood in isolation. The widespread and historical 
prejudices against those with darker skin provide a context 
which gives this denial of functionality greater weight, as does 
the specific practice—now thankfully in the past—of calling a 
specific white-normative pinkish-grey color “flesh color,” 
making dark-skinned persons unable to name the color of their 
own flesh as flesh. The exclusionary effect of the adhesive 
bandage not only appears within these contexts, but creates a 
further context: it is yet another small moment in a system of 
separate and unequal accommodation and access. We can see 
the impact of social and historical context by imagining that 
Band-Aid had chosen an umber color instead—this design 
choice may have seemed curious, but would not have been 
grounds for any serious complaint of discrimination. I suspect 
that it may not have occurred to many white users of the umber 
bandage that it had been intended to be flesh-colored at all. 
In the initial case of the job applicant, we saw (b.i) a direct 
substantial discriminatory effect. In this second case, we might 
say that the substantial discriminatory effect is (b.ii) indirect 
and emergent; it only becomes substantial when we consider 
the design choices throughout the population of service 
providers, and within the social and historical context of user 
communities. 
These considerations do not give us any clear list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for determining which 
forms of user exclusion are properly regarded as 
discriminatory, but instead are intended only to give us a sense 
of scope and scale. Any abstract theory might be able to 
establish limit cases, but is very likely, by its nature, to be 
unable to address all the factors which would go into 
determining whether a given questionable case is 
unproblematically exclusionary or problematically 
discriminatory. It is sufficient to our purposes if this section 
has established that thresholds exist past which exclusionary 
design choices are no longer necessary or acceptable but 
problematic and discriminatory, and that these thresholds vary 
according to the social context of user groups. This allows us 
to proceed to a consideration of non-affordances which 
produce exclusionary effects, and to do so with special 
attention to those such effects which are exclusionary to groups 
subject to normative exclusion on the basis of e.g. race, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, or disability. 
III. NON-AFFORDANCES  
The language of “affordances” has become widespread in 
engineering as well as interdisciplinary fields including 
Design Studies, Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Science 
and Technology Studies (STS), and Internet Studies, but there 
has been little discussion of non-affordances. Gibson [1] is the 
originator of the conceptual structure of “affordances,” and 
Norman is its most influential popularizer [2][3], but neither 
discusses non-affordances in a systematic or theorized way. 
Among the great many authors working with this conceptual 
structure, only a very few make use of the terms “non-
affordance” or “disaffordance,” and none provides either a full 
definition or a discussion of the scope and variety of cases 
falling under either term. Gee mentions “disaffordances” in 
conjunction with “affordance” without providing a definition 
for the term or any discussion of the concept in isolation, but 
usefully pointing out that “affordances and disaffordances do 
not reside in the world alone, but in the combination of the 
specific mind/body [the player-character] brings to the that 
world and the way in which that world encourages or 
discourages that specific mind/body in terms of possible 
actions” [4][5]. Marcus introduces the term on his own, but 
credits Gibson [1] for tacitly putting forth the idea, and gives 
us a bit more of a definition: “As Gibson notes ([1], p. 37), 
this can also concern the creation of obstacles in the 
environment, a form of ‘disaffordance’, to protect from or 
exclude other species or members of the own species, why we 
here also can sense a potential political dimension to the 
concept” [6]. 
No doubt it will be objected that, while the discussion of 
non-affordances and disaffordances in the scholarly record may 
be vanishingly infrequent, there is an obvious and implicit 
understanding of the idea. For example, consider the entire first 
chapter of Norman’s most famous book [2], or even just 
Carelman’s “Coffeepot for Masochists”—the coffeepot with its 
spout pointing backwards toward its handle that Norman 
discusses in the first pages of the book, and which even 
appears on the cover of my edition. Norman’s discussion, 
however—both in this first chapter and elsewhere—looks only 
at failed affordances in order to inform his analysis of 
successful affordances. 
A merely negative account of non-affordances cannot 
distinguish between kinds of failures—those which for 
example arise between the product and its function versus 
those which arise between the user and the product—and a 
positive account of various disaffordances is needed to fully 
address the challenges of design, and, in particular, to address 
our topics in this paper: when design problems become 
discriminatory, and how to avoid discriminatory design. 
IV. A TYPOLOGY OF NON-AFFORDANCES 
Thus far, following the two scholars I have found to have 
previously used the term, I have used the term “disaffordance” 
for the generic lack of affordances in design. We will now give 
this term a specific definition within a typology of non-
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affordances which is targeted toward gaining an understanding 
of how some forms of user exclusion can be discriminatory. 
Still & Dark [7] provide a very good opening to this 
discussion. They discuss Gaver’s [8] example of the cat door, 
and note that, although we do not perceive it as an affordance 
insofar as we are under no illusion that it would be a viable 
pathway whereby we could go outside, “the affordance of 
passage to another user (the cat) [is] recognized” [7]. They go 
on to ask, “Is this an example of a perceived affordance? 
Although an interesting philosophical discussion could be 
generated in response to this question, our answer in this 
context is no. In the design context, the action must apply to 
the perceiver” [7]. It is this philosophical conversation which I 
seek to generate, not to disagree with Still & Dark, but to 
expand upon and draw distinctions within their “no,” and to 
make clear that this and other non-affordances are of interest in 
a design context. 
To make sense of how the cat door can be perceived as 
affordancing without being perceived as an affordance, we 
need an idea of the normative construction of the user through 
design. We see the cat door as a door either because we 
recognize conventions that map design onto function [3] or 
through imagining ourselves as differently embodied, just as 
we might look at a scale model of a building and imagine it 
inhabited by ants rather than humans [9]. The functions are 
recognizable, and we can readily imagine from their form the 
characteristics of the user necessary to encounter those 
functions as affordancing, even though the tiny door affords us 
no passage. This can occur when design normatively implies 
afforded users from which we are physically excluded, like the 
cat door, or when we are excluded through other constraints, 
for example, social, cultural, or cognitive. Still & Dark [7] 
provide another nice example of this latter variety: the child’s 
understanding of chopsticks’ intended affordance of eating, 
even when she has not learned to use them. Here, the child sees 
the chopsticks as providing an in-principle affordance; the 
design does not present an affordance to her, but it does present 
an affordance to her imagined potential self. 
Design presents functions relative to normatively implied 
users, and our relation to the normatively implied user varies in 
consequential ways. In the cat door and chopsticks cases, the 
normatively implied user is unlike us in unproblematic ways, 
for there are either alternate objects oriented to us that provide 
us equivalent affordances (the human door), or we have clear 
pathways to changing design intention into affordance which 
are open more-or-less equally to all users like us (the 
chopsticks to a skilled user). In the problematic cases with 
which we are here concerned, the normatively implied user 
constructed through design is exclusionary of some potential 
users who are not otherwise appropriately accommodated and 
who are not different from accommodated users in relevant 
ways. 
A. Non-Affordances and Poor Affordances 
Let “non-affordance” refer to a general lack of an 
affordance in question, where we understand “affordances” as 
the perceptual presence of potential actions as such to an actor 
by virtue of a given material context of practical action. Non-
affordances, then, can include lacks of affordance due to user 
interface connection failures, e.g. using aural cues for deaf 
users. This is importantly different from design failures—in 
non-affordance, the object either does not appear in the user’s 
phenomenological horizon at all, or it does not appear as 
equipment [10] which carries with it a set of possible actions 
and functions related to our projected action(s). But non-
affordances are not necessarily discriminatory, and the term 
applies equally to the non-affordance of aural cues to the deaf 
person’s receiving instructions and windows’ non-affordance 
of infrared vision, or to a rock’s non-affordance of freshly-
brewed coffee. 
Let us then use the term “poor affordance” to refer to what 
we most often call “bad design.” In this case, the affordance 
does appear within the horizon of the user within the actor-
network [11]—in fact, it is only by virtue of this appearance 
and with reference to it that the design of the object can be 
poor! The poorness of the design consists in the presence of the 
affordance, without, however, a clear and unobstructed 
interface between its user or its object (or, in Floridi’s useful 
terminology, its “prompter” [12]). Here, too, poor affordances 
are not necessarily discriminatory, and this is where 
Carelman’s ponderously designed coffeepot belongs in our 
typology. As related to the previous example of aural cues for 
deaf users, we might consider here written prompts for pre-
literate children as a relevant variation: written words are 
present to toddlers, and are understood to be in-principle 
communicative and informational in function, even though 
these users may not personally be able to make them work. 
B. Discriminatory Non-Affordances and Poor Affordances 
Both non-affordances and poor affordances may be 
discriminatory according to the understanding of 
‘discriminatory design’ previously outlined. If, for example, a 
website contains vital information in an image with no alt-text, 
this is discriminatory to those with visual impairments, just like 
having a sign containing safety warnings with no braille 
translation or non-linguistic signalling of the danger—in either 
case, the discriminatory effect arises from a non-affordance; 
the entire non-appearance of the technical object in the user 
horizon. The adhesive bandage provides an example of 
discriminatory design arising from poor affordances: the “flesh 
coloredness” of the bandage appears as an intended affordance1 
                                                            
1 I use the circumlocution ‘appears as an intended affordance’ in order to 
avoid a contentious nest of issues which we will not be able to untangle in the 
space of this article, but which should be at least acknowledged in passing. 
The intentions of the designer to create this or that affordance are not 
necessarily relevant to the creation of discriminatory effects—it is perceived 
and effective affordances that are consequential, and these are subject to 
multistability [13] and interpretive flexibility [14] within a cultural horizon 
[15]. Material implications cannot be ignored, though, even on a constructivist 
account of technical function, and I think a notion of a technical proper 
function—adapted from Millikan’s notion of a biological proper function 
[16]—is needed to give a good account of the social-material interplay which 
gives rise to correctly perceived intended affordance. The account would 
approximately be that a technical proper function is an affordance the 
existence of which materially brings about the adoption, use, and replication 
of the technical object. This account would have the additional advantage of 
locating intended uses within the material conditions and genetic history of 
the technical object rather than referring to a designer’s mental states, 
allowing for circumstances where functional design may be replicated by 
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even though companies now know that they shouldn’t use the 
term “flesh color” to refer to white people’s average skin tone, 
and it is the phenomenal presence of this intended function, in 
conjuction with its demonstrable failure to interface with 
darker-skinned users, which constructs the user’s color as non-
normative. 
Floridi’s discussion of the ‘Janus-headedness’ of the tool 
[12] also helps to identify a distinction between discriminatory 
design and unproblematic non-affordances and poor 
affordances. The god Janus has two faces looking in different 
directions, and Floridi compares the tool to the Janus head: one 
(inter)face looks to the user; the other (inter)face looks to the 
prompter—i.e. the element of the world which the tool is 
responding to or modifying. It is the interface with the user 
whose gaze can become more easily and obviously 
discriminatory. If the bandage does not fit all or most wounds, 
we say the design is poor, or that the design problem is difficult 
(e.g. bandages interfacing with prompting wounds appearing 
on knuckles and knees). The “flesh-coloredness” of the 
bandage, however, gazes upon the user and recognizes whites 
only; its affordances are designed to interface with users, but in 
such a way that privileges one racial grouping at the exclusion 
of others. 
C. Disaffordances and Dysaffordances 
The way that discriminatory design seems to arise from 
user-(inter)facing poor affordances and non-affordances 
indicates that we can gain additional clarity by looking at how 
the object’s design fails to recognize its user. This distinction is 
not of a kind with the distinction between non-affordance and 
poor affordance: in that distinction, we looked at how the 
object appears within the user’s horizon—here, by contrast, we 
look at how the user appears within the object’s horizon. 
Let “disaffordance” refer to an object which fails to 
recognize relevant aspects of relevant users, resulting in either 
non-affordances or poor affordances. We may think of the 
stony gaze which the staircase directs toward the wheelchair 
user, but without seeing her, or seeing her as unworthy of 
responding to and interfacing with. We could also think of how 
kitchen counters are designed for women’s average height, and 
baby strollers are made so that a tall man (or an exceptionally 
tall woman) must lean down, and must take care not to take too 
long of a stride, since the brakes are often placed on the back of 
the back wheels. These and other forms of female-oriented 
design make many male homekeepers subtly but consistently 
uncomfortable and frustrated. We can also think of VR systems 
                                                                                                       
producers who do not fully understand the utilities and adaptations of 
traditional designs which are reflexively and uncritically replicated. 
The need for such an account is not “merely academic” in the colloquial 
sense. Without a robust account of what affordances can be said to be rightly 
and objectively perceived as intended, it is unclear how we can justifiably 
distinguish between a poorly designed affordance and someone just using 
something wrong. Hand-waving toward ‘perceived affordances’ may be fine 
for our purposes here, but it does not properly establish the objective basis for 
these judgments. If we are to give a complete account of how some but not all 
logically possible affordances can be objectively identified as relevant when 
not provided, a desk in a public office which cannot accommodate wheelchair 
users must be describable as broken according to reasoning which is 
simultaneously able to explain why the desk’s failure to accommodate 
napping hyenas or naval military offensives does not make it broken. 
which produce perceived three-dimensionality through 
parallax-motion systems rather than shape-from-shading: the 
former system works well for most men but produces nausea in 
many women, whose brains are more likely than men’s to use 
the latter pattern to construct perceived three-dimensionality 
[17]. 
Disaffordances, in this novel and specific definition, can 
follow from poor affordances with discriminatory effects, as in 
the examples in the previous paragraph, but we have also 
already seen examples of disaffordances which follow from 
non-affordances: for example, the sign without braille or the 
image without alt-text. 
Using a related but distinct prefix to name a related but 
distinct phenomenon, let “dysaffordance” refer to an object 
which not only fails to recognize relevant aspects of relevant 
users, but which also requires users to misidentify themselves 
in order to gain access to an object’s functions or products. The 
Latin prefix “dis” usually names a lack or a separation; by 
contrast, the Greek prefix “dys” usually names a malfunction 
or problem—here, “disaffordance” refers to a design-based 
separation from an object’s functionality based on user 
identity, while “dysaffordance” refers to a design-based 
requirement of certain users to misidentify themselves in order 
to gain access to an object’s functionality. 
Examples of dysaffordances abound, but seem necessarily 
to fall entirely within the realm of poor affordances rather than 
non-affordances. We may think of binarisms in user data entry 
fields, requiring gender non-binary persons to choose between 
male and female gender identities, and requiring bisexual 
dating site users to (mis)identify themselves as either gay or 
straight. We may think of SNS real-name policies, which often 
require users to identify themselves in accordance with 
governmental documentation rather than in accordance with 
their lived identity—a particularly consequential 
misidentification for transgender persons. 
V. PRINCIPLES OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY DESIGN 
The various kinds of discriminatory design problems 
identified above can give us a sense of the scope and variety of 
issues that the anti-discriminatory designer must guard against. 
Consideration of this scope and variety will demonstrate the 
necessity of taking a proactively anti-discriminatory approach 
and the insufficiency of merely not being actively 
discriminatory to the prevention of discriminatory effects. A 
methodology for anti-discriminatory design can then be 
recommended and described: producing discrimination impact 
assessments through phenomenological variation oriented by 
standpoint epistemology. 
A. The Scope and Variety of Discriminatory Design Problems 
In section II, we identified (b.i) direct and (b.ii) indirect 
discriminatory effects, where in the former the discriminatory 
effect arises from user exclusion from object functionality, and 
in the latter the discriminatory effect arises from differential 
user access to functionalities rather than outright exclusion. In 
section IV.A. & B., we distinguished non-affordances from 
poor affordances, where in the former some affordances do not 
appear within some relevant users’ experience at all, and in the 
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latter intended affordances do not provide actual affordances. 
In section IV.C., we distinguished discriminatory 
disaffordances from discriminatory dysaffordances, where in 
the former the object fails to recognize relevant user identities 
in a way that gives rise to direct (b.i) or indirect (b.ii) 
discriminatory effects through either poor affordances or 
through non-affordances, and in the latter the object both fails 
to recognize some relevant user identities and also requires 
some relevant users to actively misidentify themselves in order 
to gain access to intended affordances. 
In these overlapping distinctions we see three primary loci 
of design problems: 1. The user’s phenomenal experience, in 
which the object may be either present in a more-or-less 
obstructive form, or simply absent; 2. The object’s implicit 
construction of a user in its interface design, in which some 
users may not be recognized or may be recognized poorly; and 
3. The social context in which the user-object connection, 
considered in either directionality (1. or 2.), takes place. 
B. The Need for Anti-Discriminatory Design 
The identification of these loci demonstrates the likely 
insufficiency of a mere lack of discriminatory intent to prevent 
discriminatory design. In (1.) and (2.), we can easily anticipate 
how difficult it is, at each stage of the design process, to 
imagine how the user interface will appear to all kinds of 
users—persons of all races, language abilities, gender 
identities, sexual orientations, religions, disabilities, ages, body 
types, etc.—and how users among those groups and within the 
intersectionalities that they present will experience the 
interface. In (3.), we can see, further, how, even were this 
kaleidoscopic imagining of all relevant users’ experience of 
and through the interface successful, it would still be 
insufficient to anticipate discriminatory effects which follow 
from social histories and prior lived experience actuated by but 
not contained within the interface. To use a blatant example: 
thinking about what it’s like to be black can tell you that your 
photobooth application ought to include brightness correction 
to that a dark skin tone can be treated as the subject of the 
portrait rather than being treated as “shadow,” balancing 
exposure and contrast so that black people do not appear as 
silouhettes. But, valuable as that consideration of how the 
interface interfaces with users is, it won’t tell you why it would 
upset some users if your app prompted the user to smile by 
saying “Say fried chicken and watermelon!”—for this, we need 
a history of racialized experience in the larger context in which 
this interface appears. 
The overwhelming diversity of user experiences, along 
with the overwhelming difficulty of anticipating and 
accounting for these user experiences, impresses upon us the 
insufficiency of simply following established practices for non-
discriminatory design, such as ADA/508 compliance, to 
prevent discriminatory design from occurring. Hence, we must 
not be merely non-discriminatory designers, but actively anti-
discriminatory designers. Even so, avoiding discriminatory 
effects entirely during the design process seems impossible, 
and being responsive to user complaints and requests in post-
release iterative redesign certainly seems to be a necessary 
remediation. But still, we can become better at anticipating 
discriminatory effects, and we have an obligation to do so even 
if perfect anticipation of and design for all relevant user 
experiences is impossible. 
C. Methodology for Anti-Discriminatory Design 
The importance of diversity in developer teams cannot be 
ignored. Those who are marginalized or excluded by systems 
of power and interpretation are better able to see those systems 
at work than those who are privileged by them—privilege, 
indeed, consists largely in the freedom from being required to 
notice these systems at all. This point from feminist standpoint 
epistemology—that marginalization produces locations of 
epistemic advantage—is obviously relevant in a design 
context. It seems common-sensical, for example, to assume 
that very few, if any, black developers were involved in 
programming a facial recognition system that was bad at 
recognizing dark-skinned users [18], or an automated image 
tagging system that identified black photographic subjects as 
“gorillas” [19].  
Diverse developer teams, however helpful, cannot present a 
complete solution or a foolproof fix, for several reasons. First, 
even those in locations of epistemic advantage may fail to 
notice their own marginalization, since marginalizing 
interpretations tend to be internalized by those marginalized by 
them, this being, in fact, one of the primary pathways by which 
marginalization occurs. Just because someone is a woman, for 
example, it cannot be assumed that she will notice all instances 
of sexism—for example, use of the generic “he” in 
documentation discussing users of technical or professional 
software—or that she will feel her voice legitimated enough 
within the design context to express and insist upon addressing 
these issues when they are noticed. Second, even if we could 
count on all marginalized persons to be fully aware of their 
own marginalization, and fully politicized such that they would 
always insist on addressing such issues, no developer team 
could be expected to be fully representative of the diversity of 
identity groups and intersectionalities within the relevant user 
base. Third, even if a developer team somehow were absolutely 
diverse, absolutely self-aware, and absolutely politicized, such 
a strategy for anti-discriminatory design wrongly implies that 
the socially privileged designer has neither ability nor 
responsibility to engage in anti-discriminatory design. In other 
words, a developer working on her own should not excuse 
herself from the responsibility to attempt to think through 
diverse user experiences, and “Yeah, well I’m not Asian” 
would not a satisfactory apology for e.g. designing image 
recognition software that causes cameras to insist on repeatedly 
asking many East Asian users “Did someone blink?” [20]. 
Aside from the obviously valuable but no-silver-bullet 
method of increasing diversity in developer teams, anti-
discriminatory design methods can be identified at micro- and 
macro-levels, in order to address the both the user-object 
interface (V.1. & 2. above) and the larger historical and social 
context and impact (V.3. above). 
At the micro-level, phenomenological variation, as 
described by Ihde [13] will help in proactively anti-
discriminatory design. In the process of phenomenological 
variation, we begin with a given human-technics relation and 
sucessively alter different aspects of the user and of the device 
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in order to identify and articulate where and when alterations 
of the human or of the device alter the human-technics relation 
and its functionality. This cannot be reduced to ‘imagining 
what it would be like to be a user, except [gay or latino or deaf 
or etc. etc.]’. When we simply imagine being this or that 
identity group we import our own sense of our own normality, 
producing a bias against alternate user experiences, and we are 
not likely to think through the concrete details of different 
social and physical embodiments. The systematic 
control/experiment group process of phenomenological 
variation has a much better chance of noticing e.g. that using 
contrast patterns in facial mapping may require different 
programming for different skin tones, or that e.g. hosting 
professional activities on Second Life may create troubling 
dynamics given the relative unavailability of office-appropriate 
clothing for female avatars in that virtual environment. 
At the macro-level, Bush [21] has suggested conducting 
gender impact assessment reports, akin to the environmental 
impact assessment reports to which businesses have 
(sometimes reluctantly) become accustomed. Here, I will 
suggest a more general diversity impact assessment report, to 
include the range of relevant diverse user groups rather than 
gender alone. A population-wide and longitudinal impact 
analysis of this kind is needed to identify emergent 
discriminatory effects which may not be phenomenally present 
in the interface itself in an isolated user interaction and, thus, 
which phenomenological variation is unlikely to highlight. We 
can find a fine example in the classic case of the FBI “Taco 
Circuit” [22]. The FBI recognized and valued the Spanish-
language skills that Hispanic agents often brought to the 
agency, and assigned them tasks where those skills were 
recognized and put to use. So far, so good! But as a result, 
Hispanic agents were more often placed in secondary and 
support roles, where they translated, interpreted, and 
transcribed for their white colleagues who, because they had 
lesser language skills on average, were placed in primary and 
leadership roles where they were more able to gain recognition 
and promotion. We can also consider another related but very 
everyday example: calendar design. Scheduling all office 
holidays and team deadlines so that they match with Christian 
faith observance reduces opportunities from observant 
members of non-Christian faiths, since their observance, unlike 
that of their Christian coworkers, requires them to miss work, 
to miss opportunities to play more central roles, and possibly to 
be perceived as unreliable. 
These techniques, though, are no substitute for robust 
engagement with marginalized users and user communities, 
and, although worth pursuing, are strongly limited by the 
difficulty of anticipating and understanding the lived 
experiences of others. When we try to imagine the experience 
of others, we tend to imagine someone else as 'ourself + 
[variation]'. The constancy of what we perceive as the ‘core’ or 
‘true self’ fails to consider and account for the determination of  
values and goals related to varying life experiences in ways we 
fail to appreciate. These limitations are displayed clearly in the 
discredited [23] practice of “disability simulation,” where, for 
example, a nondisabled person is asked to navigate an 
environment in a wheelchair in order, supposedly, to gain a 
better understanding of the experiences of disabled persons. 
These “simulations” produce an unrealistic understanding of 
the life experience of disability for a number of reasons: the 
nondisabled person does not have the alternate skill sets 
developed by disabled persons, and thus overestimates the loss 
of function which disability presents, and is furthermore likely 
to think of able-normative solutions rather than solutions more 
attuned to a disabled person's life experience. Similarly, even 
when they proactively try to imagine and accommodate 
architectural engagements of disabled persons, nondisabled 
designers tend to enforce a bipedal-normative ablist agenda in 
accomodation design, while by contrast, as Shew [24] points 
out, conversations with wheelchair users may reveal  less 
interest in finding technologies which allow bipedal navigation 
of able-normative architectures and more interest in altering 
architectures to accommodate non-normative embodiments 
which better represent disabled persons' preferred modes of 
mobility and interaction.  
Phenomenological variation and longitudinal impact 
assessments can help to identify discriminatory design, but the 
value of these practices is not only limited by, but is even 
potentially significantly undermined by overestimation our 
ability to understand and anticipate the life experiences of 
others. 
To conclude: Best practices for implementing anti-
discriminatory design methodology—discussed here as 
phenomenological variation and diversity impact assessment as 
oriented by standpoint epistemology—will necessarily vary 
widely, depending on what is being developed, and which 
groups are most relevant and most at risk. I hope this 
discussion is sufficient, though, to establish these guiding 
principles of anti-discriminatory design: 
• Seek out diversity in developer teams, and give weight 
and respect to marginalized perspectives especially 
when they do not accord with normative (e.g. 
white/male/straight/Christian/nondisabled/etc.) 
perceptions. 
• Engage in systematic phenomenological variation to 
identify problem areas in the user interface. Think 
through differences relevant to social and physical 
embodiments in areas of race, disability, gender, 
religion, sexual orientation, transgender status, and 
other areas as prompted by intended affordances. 
• Conduct population-wide and longitudinal diversity 
impact assessments of potentially marginalized groups, 
especially emphasizing groups identified as relevant 
through phenomenological variation. 
And, given the particular histories of many of the cases 
brought up in the course of this discussion, we should also add: 
• Test with diverse users and be clear that you value and 
are seeking out feedback related to their particular 
experiences from their particular social and physical 
embodiments. 
• Keep in mind that even all this will not catch every 
problem. When something goes wrong, admit that it’s a 
real problem, that the user is not wrong or unimportant, 
and try to fix it.  
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What’s most distressing about some of these cases is not 
the discriminatory impact, or the designers’ failure to think 
through user diversity, but instead the dismissive responses to 
user complaints which explicitly restate what discriminatory 
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